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RESÜMEE
Dieser Aufsatz untersucht den Schnittpunkt zwischen dem entstehenden und sich wandeln-
den sowjetischen Wohlfahrtsstaat einerseits, und gesetzlicher Privilegierung von ehemaligen 
Soldaten des Zweiten Weltkrieges andererseits. Es wird gezeigt, dass – im Kontrast zu ande-
ren Gesellschaften wie den USA oder Australien – kein kausaler Zusammenhang zwischen 
Veteranenversorgung und wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Entwicklung besteht. Wohlfahrtspfl ege für die 
breite Bevölkerung und Veteranenversorgung standen vielmehr in Konkurrenz zueinander. Der 
Aufsatz beginnt mit einem Überblick über die sich wandelnde Terminologie, die im sowjeti-
schen Kontext die Kriegsveteranen beschreibt, sowie die mit diesen Konzepten verknüpften, 
sich ebenfalls wandelnden gesetzlichen Bestimmungen. Der zweite Teil skizziert sodann die 
Geschichte des sowjetischen Wohlfahrtsstaates, und zeigt auf, dass dieser nicht von der Vetera-
nenversorgung angetrieben wurde. Erst in den späten 70er Jahren konvergierten die getrenn-
ten Entwicklungslinien der Veteranenversorgung und des Wohlfahrtsstaates. Seit 1978 können 
wir von Kriegsveteranen als einer „avant garde“ in der Altenversorgung sprechen.
1 I tried a fi rst stab at the intersection of veterans’ policy and broader welfare development in a paper entitled 
“Veterans as the Avant Garde of the Soviet Welfare State?“, which was presented at the Annual Convention of 
the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New Orleans, 18 November 2007. The thought 
process started in this paper developed in a slightly diff erent direction in “Warfare and Welfare: The Soviet Union 
in the Twentieth Century,“ a paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for Eu-
ropean History (AAEH), Adelaide, 6-9 July 2009. The calculations of demobilization numbers were fi rst presented 
as part of a paper entitled “The Cold War and Soviet Troop Reductions, 1945–1960,“ at the Slavic Research Center, 
Hokkaido University 2008 Summer International Symposium Northeast Asia in the Cold War: New Evidence and 
Perspectives (26-27 June 2008). An earlier draft of the current version was discussed at the workshop “Veteranen 
und Kriegsgeschädigte in Osteuropa (20. Jahrhundert),” 16 February 2010, Lehrstuhl für Geschichte Südost- und 
Osteuropas, Universität Regensburg, and WIOS, Regensburg. I thank all participants in the resulting discussions 
for their often thoughtful, frequently helpful and only sometimes angry reactions.
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War making produces veterans as potential political actors and warring nations have 
several options for accommodating their demands. Reintegration can either be monopo-
lized by the state or left to the non-state sector and the goal can either be the complete 
transformation of the soldiers into civilians (“demobilization”) or their metamorpho-
sis into a status group. Th e resulting combinations are illustrated in table 1. Germany 
and Britain after the Great War are examples of societies where the complete reintegra-
tion into civilian life was the aspiration. Germany focused on state action, while Britain 
leaned on the non-governmental sector to achieve the same end. In the same period, 
France is a prominent example for the other strategy – to reintegrate soldiers by forging 
them into a civilian status group. Government policy and legislation played a large role 
in this process, but self-organization was equally central in creating the compact between 
former soldiers and the state.2 Hence, table 1 locates the French example at the intersec-
tion of the two right boxes.
Table 1: Regimes for the Accommodation of Veterans
Main actors: 
 
State   
Soviet Union 1945–1948 
 
Germany after World War I 
 
 











Soviet Union 1948–1978 
 
Main goal: Demobilization  continuation of status 
France after World War I
Ever since World War II, the Soviet authorities claimed that no other government cared 
so much for former soldiers as that of the fi rst socialist state. Th e subjects of such pro-
nouncements, however, knew better. In a letter to the authorities in 1978, one veteran 
put the record straight. Quoting Brezhnev’s remark, that Party and government “have 
already done quite a bit” for veterans, he wrote that in real life “there are absolutely no 
… privileges” (A l’got etikh … nikakikh net).3 Th at this former soldier was right does not 
2 Antoine Prost, Les anciens combattants et la société française: 1914–1939. 3 vols., Paris 1977; Michael Geyer, Ein 
Vorbote des Wohlfahrtsstaates. Die Kriegsopferversorgung in Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien nach 
dem Ersten Weltkrieg, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 9 (1983): 230-77; Deborah Cohen, The War Come Home. 
Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914–1939, Berkeley / Los Angeles / London 2001.
3 For Brezhnev’s remarks see his speech of 4 October 1977, in: Izvestiia , 5 October 1977: p. 2-3. Report of A. N. 
Vasil’enko to Propaganda Department of CC CPSU, on letters to the newspaper Trud in April 1978 (28 April 1978), 
RGANI f. 5, op. 75, d. 250, l. 48-52, here: 50.
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prevent the myth of the caring Soviet state to reappear, again and again, not only in the 
publications of the Russian veterans’ movement dreaming about a golden past, but also 
in academic literature critical of the current state of aff airs. In this discourse, the pres-
ent is juxtaposed with the alleged “upward mobility” of World War II veterans, and the 
“impressive set of privileges” supposedly granted to them by a regime which considered 
“provision of support for the needy … a top state priority.”4 
Th e reality is that between 1947 and 1978 there were few real advantages for those who 
had fought in the war. Somewhat schematically, we can summarize the Soviet pattern 
to move from a totalitarian version of the German or British pattern (where the goal is 
complete reintegration into civilian life) to an authoritarian version of the French model 
(where a new corporate group is created through a combination of organization and 
status ascription), via a period where veterans were largely ignored by legislation and 
welfare provision (table 1). Between 1947 and 1978, most veterans only had “informal 
privileges,” a problematic category as I shall argue below. Th is notion does, however, 
capture the continued existence of a social entity of former soldiers despite the attempts 
of the authorities to declare the problem solved. After 1948, veterans continued to exist 
as an “entitlement group,” a collectivity which shared, if not always a sense of itself as a 
unit, the conviction that war service entitled to a better life – and many other citizens 
agreed, irrespective of offi  cial policy or the letter of the law.5 By the 1980s, this new social 
entity mutated again, this time into a legally constituted status group. 
Th is transformation was a slow process which took three decades to mature. First came 
the rise of the war cult as a new legitimizing myth of the regime, particularly from 1965 
onwards;6 second came the elevation of uchastnik Otechestvennoi voiny (“participant of 
the patriotic war”) to a new status from 1978 and its both gradual and partial broadening 
4 For challenges of the myth see Elena Zubkova, Russia after the War. Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 
1945–1957. Translated by Hugh Ragsdale, Armonk/London 1998, esp. chapter 2; Beate Fieseler, Stimmen aus 
dem gesellschaftlichen Abseits. Die sowjetrussischen Kriegsinvaliden im ‚Tauwetter’ der Fünfziger Jahre, in: Ost-
europa 52, no. 7 (2002): 945-62; id., Die Invaliden des ‚Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges’ der Sowjetunion –- Eine 
Politische Sozialgeschichte 1941–1991. Habilitationsschrift, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 2003; id., Arme Sieger. Die 
Invaliden des Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges, in: Osteuropa 55, no. 4-6 (2005): 207-17; id., The Bitter Legacy 
of the ‚Great Patriotic War.’ Red Army Disabled Soldiers under Late Stalinism, in: Late Stalinist Russia. Society 
between Reconstruction and Reinvention, ed. Juliane Fürst, London/New York 2006, 46-61. Most recently, see 
also Robert Dale, Rats and Resentment: The Demobilization of the Red Army in Postwar Leningrad, 1945–50, 
in: Journal of Contemporary History 45, no. 1 (2010): 113-33. For a more positive evaluation of the immediate 
postwar years see Kees Boterbloem, Soviet GIs or Decembrists? The Reintegration into Postwar Soviet Society of 
Russian Soldiers, POWs, Partisans, and Civilians Who Lived under German Occupation, in: War & Society 25, no. 1 
(2006): 77-87. For celebrations of Soviet welfare for Second World War veterans see Ethel Dunn, Disabled Russian 
War Veterans: Surviving the Collapse of the Soviet Union, in: Disabled Veterans in History, ed. David. A. Gerber, 
Ann Arbor 2000, 251-70; Natalia Danilova, The Development of an Exclusive Veterans’ Policy: The Case of Russia, 
in: Armed Forces & Society XX, no. X (2009): 1-27, esp. 12-13 (quotations); and Joonseo Song, Rule of Inclusion: 
The Politics of Postwar Stalinist Care in Magnitogorsk, 1945–1953, in: Journal of Social History 43, No. 3 (2010): 
663-680, here: 663 (quotations).
5 Mark Edele, Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group, 1945–1955, in: Slavic Review 65, no. 1 (2006): 111-37.
6 Nina Tumarkin, The Living & the Dead. The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia, New York 1994; Lisa 
A. Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941–1995. Myth, Memories, and Monuments, Cam-
bridge/New York 2006; Denise J. Youngblood, Russian War Films. On the Cinema Front, 1914–2005, Lawrence 
2007.
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to all “veterans” (veterany) of this confl ict; and third came Gorbachev’s organization of all 
of the latter in the new veterans’ organization in 1986. Underlying the entire process was 
a veterans’ movement, which since 1956 was partially organized but, more importantly, 
took much of its strength and dynamism from a widespread sense of entitlement, a no-
tion that war service had created a claim to special treatment and a better life.7
In order to clarify these developments, we fi rst have to survey the terms used in the 
Soviet context to describe veterans and the changing legal meaning they acquired. Sec-
tion I will also give estimates of the sizes of the various groups of former soldiers. Th e 
second section will then sketch the history of the Soviet welfare state in order to establish 
the wider context in which these changes took place. I will argue that, until 1978, the 
development of veterans’ welfare ran counter-cyclical to the overall growth of the welfare 
state. Whenever the latter was put on the back burner, the former profi ted; once veterans 
were ignored, the welfare state grew. Only from 1978 onwards we see a reversal of this 
process. Now, “war participants” took the lead in the creation of welfare legislation for 
the older generation more generally. Th e fi nal section turns to the question of “social 
mobility” of veterans, demonstrating that the notion of preferential treatment of Soviet 
veterans and their supposed elevated status in postwar society relies on a projection of the 
post-1978 regime to earlier decades – an anachronism which universalizes the experience 
of a minority.
1. Legal categories and legal history
Following the Latin meaning of the term, a “veteran” is either an experienced soldier or 
a demobilized participant in an armed confl ict. Th ere were maybe 25 million veterans in 
this sense of the word at the end of World War II, not counting surviving underground 
fi ghters and other irregulars.8 Th ey comprised about 15 percent of the population. Th e 
calculation of these numbers is tentative, not only because postwar population totals 
rely on somewhat controversial reconstructions, but also because there is no exact Soviet 
equivalent to the Latin meaning of the term and hence no archival data on this category 
of citizens.9 Th e primary sources (both archival and published) instead use fi ve other 
terms with partially overlapping semantic fi elds – invalid voiny, uchastnik voiny, fron-
tovik, demobilizovannyi, and, yes, veteran. While the same words reappear in the context 
of other wars, I will focus here on their meanings with regards to World War II, or, more 
7 For a detailed account of the legal and organizational history see Mark Edele, Soviet Veterans of the Second 
World War. A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 1941–1991, Oxford 2008, chapters 7 and 8.
8 Calculated from G. F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, London 1997, 
91; id., Poteri vooruzhennykh sil SSSR, in: Liudskie poteri SSSR v period Vtoroi mirovoi voiny: Sbornik statei, St. Pe-
tersburg 1995, 27. For a tabulation see Edele, “Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group,” 120, table 2. On irregulars 
see Kenneth Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas. Soviet Partisans in World War II, Lawrence, Kansas 2006.
9 Most historical demographers assume a total population of 171 million by early 1946. See, for example, Nasele-
nie Rossii v XX veke. Istoricheskie ocherki, vol. 2: 1940–1959, Moscow 2001, 134.
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precisely, the German-Soviet war, dubbed the “Great Patriotic War” (Velikaia Otechest-
vennaia voina) in Soviet parlance. 
Th e fi rst of these terms is the oldest legal status of (some) veterans in the Latin meaning 
of the word. Since 1940, an increasingly complex legislation regulated the rights and 
duties of disabled servicemen, soon termed Invalids of the Patriotic War, who were clas-
sifi ed by work ability into three groups: I for the most severely injured, III for those with 
most labor power remaining. Th eir number repeatedly changed due to death and re-clas-
sifi cation, but in the immediate postwar years hovered somewhere around two percent 
of the overall population and between ten and 15 percent of all war veterans. During 
the entire war, some 3.8 million service-personnel were “invalided out” of the fi ghting 
forces; by early 1946, the offi  cial tally was down to 2.8 million, while only 2.6 million 
continued to be recognized as “permanently disabled.”10 Despite such eff orts at limit-
ing their number, this was not an insignifi cant share in regional comparison. In relative 
terms, for example, the Soviet Union acknowledged more war invalids after 1945 than, 
for example, Czechoslovakia in the interwar years (1.4 percent of the population – see 
contribution by Stegmann in this volume). As we will see below, the institutionalization 
of “war participants” as a status group in the late 1970s would privilege a very similar 
share of the population – three percent.
Notwithstanding such comparisons, the disabled were a minority among those who had 
seen service in the war. For this larger group two main terms circulated in public dis-
course: “frontline soldier” (frontovik) and “Participant of the Patriotic War“ (uchastnik 
Otechestvennoi voiny). Th e former was not a legal term, but frequently used; the latter was 
a legal term, but used infrequently at the time. Th is was the category which came closest 
to encompassing all veterans in the understanding of this essay: According to the Soviet 
veterans’ organization, there were about 20 million “war participants” in 1945 (or twelve 
percent of the population).11 Th is word rose to prominence in the 1970s, in tandem with 
the term veteran, which played little role immediately after the war. As we shall see be-
low, the most important legal term in 1945–1948 besides war invalid was “demobilized 
soldier” (demobilizovannyi). 
In diff erent periods, then, diff erent terms were at the center of veterans’ welfare.12 Until 
1945, and again from 1948 to 1978, the major term was invalid Otechestvennoi voiny, 
a status emerging out of the 1940 legislation regarding military pensions. In addition 
to pensions (stratifi ed by group of invalidity, pre-war income, and military rank), war 
invalids could in theory (if not always in practice) receive a variety of material benefi ts 
(for more on their situation see the contribution of Beate Fieseler in this volume). Th ese 
included preferred access to food, fuel, consumer goods, and housing, exemptions from 
tuition payment in higher education, tax privileges, special labor regulations and better 
10 Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties, 92; Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War. Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939–1945, 
New York 2006, 363. 
11 Victor Stepanovich Nechaev, Sila Veteranakh – v edinenii, in: Veteran. Gazeta sotsial’noi zashchity, no. 31 (320), 
October 1994, p. 1.
12 Edele, Soviet Veterans, 84-89.
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conditions for housing construction loan repayments. Between 1948 and the 1960s, 
changes to this privilege system were slow, and confi ned largely to some adjustments of 
pension regulation and size of payments. Th e 1960s saw a growth of privileges with re-
gards to housing, public transport, labor regulations, medical care, and scarce consumer 
goods – a legislative activity which gathered further steam in the 1970s. Th e end point 
of this development were the 23 February 1981 Statutes on Privileges of Invalids of the 
Patriotic War and the Families of Fallen Servicemen, which systematized the legislation 
in one legal act.13 From this date onwards, the status of Invalid of the Patriotic War began 
to grow into the new and developing category of “war participant,” which would also 
give a ride to the “veteran.”
Th e “participant of the Patriotic War” (uchastnik Otechestvennoi voiny), which became 
the central term of positive legal discrimination from 1978 onwards, had a somewhat 
subterranean history until that date. Th e term had already emerged during the war to 
designate experienced fi ghters.14 After the war, it became a symbolic status, connected 
to the Victory medals of 1945. Th e medal For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic 
War 1941–1945 was awarded to all soldiers who had served at least three, and to civilian 
personnel with a service record of at least eight months during the war. Th e medal came 
with a legal document (udostoverenie) which included the words „to the war participant“ 
(Uchastniku voiny).15 In terms of legal privileges, the category entitled to easier access to 
stipends, preferred admission to preparatory courses, technical colleges, institutes and 
universities. It did not free from entrance exams, as is sometimes suggested, nor did it 
give exemption from tuition payment or better stipends. Th e rights were much more 
modest, allowing students who had fi nished school with distinction before the war (otli-
chniki, a mark of high academic achievement which allowed admission without exams) 
to take advantage of this status despite the time lag caused by the war. Everybody else did 
have to sit and pass exams, but were then admitted outside of the ranking system (vne 
konkursa).16 Th e category of war participant re-emerged during the growing war cult as a 
term of praise, especially from 1965 onwards, and was fi nally instituted in the 1978 land-
mark decree creating the basis for the fully blown privileges system of the fi nal decade of 
Soviet history.17 Central Committee and Council of Ministers Resolution No. 907 of 10 
13 Sobranie postanovlenii pravitel’stva SSSR (= SP SSSR), 1981, No. 12, st. 71, p. 315-26. 
14 See, for example, the order of the 147th Rifl e division of 31 May 1942. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA; Frei-
burg im Breisgau) RH 26/297/100.
15 G. M. Shirshov, Oni stali osnovnym kontingentom Sovetskoi Armii, in: Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 3, 2008: 
34-35, here: 35. On the political struggles about the boundaries of this category see also Tat’iana Vladimorovna 
Chertoritskaia, Dorogie moi veterany: Iz istorii razrabotki i priniatiia zakonodatel’stva vo veteranakh, St. Peters-
burg 1995. 
16 Mark Edele, A ‘Generation of Victors?’ Soviet Second World War Veterans from Demobilization to Organization 
1941–1956. Ph.D. diss., The University of Chicago, 2004, 122-23.
17 Edele, Soviet Veterans, 9-10, 202-207. For a quick o verview over the defi nition of the category and the associ-
ated privileges by the time of the 40th anniversary of Victory see Uchastniki voiny, in: Velikaia Otechestvennaia 
voina, 1941–1945: Entsiklopediia, Moscow 1985, 751.
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November 1978 gave special rights with regards to travel, holidaying, recreation leave, 
housing loans, medical care, gardening cooperatives, and private telephones.18 
During mass demobilization, the term war participant was less important, and most of 
the struggle between veterans and the state of the immediate postwar years – delivery of 
promises always was a problem – focused on either the status of war invalid, or that of 
the person “demobilized from the Red Army” (demobilizovannyi).19 Th is group’s privi-
leges were regulated in the demobilization law of 23 June 1945, which was applied to 
subsequent demobilization waves in 1946 and 1947, when many millions were released 
to reduce the armed forces to peacetime strength. It promised a uniform and a pair 
of shoes (no civilian clothes, although these were sometimes distributed from trophy 
funds), transport back home and food during the journey, a lump sum payment strati-
fi ed by rank and length of service, help in reestablishing housing and placement into a 
job commensurate with skills and pre-war occupation. It also announced preferred access 
to heating fuel upon arrival, and more generally “utmost help” from local authorities.20 
How many veterans were in principle eligible for these benefi ts cannot be determined 
with precision. Th e standard histories of demobilization speak of 8.5 million demobi-
lized soldiers between 1945 and 1948.21 Th e latest archival data we have, by contrast, are 
from 1 January 1947, when a total of 7.6 million demobilized soldiers had arrived in the 
localities.22 Searching for an original source for the higher number leads the historian ei-
ther into blind alleys or to a speech by N. S. Khrushchev on troop reductions of 1960.23 
Th e Soviet leader mentioned the troop strength of the victorious army as 11.4 million by 
May 1945, adding that “towards 1948” (k 1948 godu) this number had fallen to 2.9 mil-
lion.24 Th e diff erence between these two levels – the famous 8.5 million – cannot be the 
total number of demobilized soldiers, because mobilization of younger cohorts and re-
mobilization of specialists continued as older soldiers were released.25 Moreover, by early 
June 1945, just before demobilization commenced, the troop strength had increased to 
18 SP SSSR, 1978, No. 27, st. 164, p. 540-42.
19 The classical study of this group and its postwar fate is V. N. Donchenko, Demobilizatsiia Sovetskoi Armii i reshe-
nie problem kadrov v pervye poslevoennye gody, in: Istoriia SSSR, no. 3 (1970): 96-106.
20 Edele, Soviet Veterans, 34, 191. For an overview over the demobilization waves, complete with birth cohorts, 
time periods, and sources for the relevent legal acts see ibid., 23 (table 1.1). For a booklet informing soldiers 
about their rights and benefi ts see Pamiatka demobilizovannym riadovym i serzhantam Krasnoi Armii, 2nd 
enlarged ed., Moscow 1946. An early study of this legislation is Carol Jacobson, The Soviet G.I.’s Bill of Rights, in: 
American Review on the Soviet Union 7, no. 1 (1945): 56-63.
21 For example: B. N. Ponomarev (ed.), Istoriia SSSR s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, 12 vols., vol. 11, Mo-
scow 1980, 56; or the article on demobilization in the authroritative handbook: Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina, 
1941–1945: Entsiklopediia, Moscow 1985, 237-38, here: 238. 
22 Statistical report by Committee for registration and distribution of labor under Sovnarkom, Gosudarstvennyi 
Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF) f. r-9517, op. 1, d. 56, l. 1.
23 For a documentation of such chasing of historical geese see Edele, A Generation of Victors, 41, fn. 5.
24 Pravda, 15 January 1960, 1-5, here: 3.
25 In May 1945 the birth year 1928 was prepared for the draft, which might explain the rise of the numbers bet-
ween then and June. See the protocol of closed party cell meeting in Gork’ii gorvoenkomat, 21 May 1945: 
Gosudarstvennyi obshchestvenno-politicheskii arkhiv Nizhegorodskoi oblasti (GOPANO) f. 4968, op. 3, d. 4, l. 
16. And in early 1947, demobilized airmen were re-drafted. See Peter Pirogov, Why I Escaped. The Story of Peter 
Pirogov, New York 1950, 245.
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12.8 million26 – implying a contraction of the army by 9.9 million during mass demobi-
lization. Table 2 summarizes these data.
Table 2: Reconstruction of number of demobilized soldiers, 1945–1948






A May 1945 11.4 xxxxxxxxx Khrushchev
B June 1945 12.8 xxxxxxxxx Krivosheev and Filimoshin
C early 1948 2.9 xxxxxxxxx Khrushchev
D 1945–1948 xxxxxxxxxx 8.5
Standard Soviet histories, 
also implied by comparing 
Khrushchev’s numbers for 
1945 and 1948 (D=A-C)
E June 1945 – 1 January 1947 7.6 Archival
F June 1945 – early 1948 9.9 F = B-C
Another category, “veteran” (veteran), became central only in the process of extending 
much of the privileges of war participants to more or less the entire older generation 
between 1978 and the mid-1980s. Veteran had been a term used infrequently in the im-
mediate postwar years, and if used it referred to experienced soldiers within the armed 
forces, rather than people who had returned to civilian life. It had no legal meaning.27 In 
1956, the term received a new lease on life, when the regime attempted to join the World 
Veterans Federation (FMAC), and hence needed its own front organization, the Soviet 
Committee of War Veterans (Sovetskii komitet veteranov voiny – SKVV). Against the 
original intentions, the SKVV became extremely popular among veterans, was appropri-
ated by them as a lobbying organization, and fl owered organizationally from 1965, be-
fore being cut back to size by decree in 1976. As instituted in the SKVV, the term veteran 
referred to former combat personnel; subsequently, the concept became more inclusive, 
denoting anybody who had made a contribution to the war eff ort. Institutionally, this 
enveloping of the entire war generation was realized in the 1986 foundation of the “All-
Union Organization of Veterans of War and Labor” (Vsesoiuznaia organizatsiia veteranov 
voiny i truda), which absorbed the SKVV in a somewhat uneasy settlement as well.28 
In Gorbachev’s explanation of the necessity of the new institution, “veterans” became a 
“strata” within the population (sloi naseleniia), which the leader described as made up of 
26 G. F. Krivosheev and M. F. Filimoshin, „Poteri vooruzhennykh sil SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine,“ in: Nasele-
nie Rossii v XX veke. Istoricheskie ocherki, vol. 2: 1940–1959, ed. V. B. Zhiromskaia, Moscow 2001, 26.
27 See, for example, Vstrechi veteranov s molodimi voinami, in: Krasnaia zvezda, 8 May 1947, p. 2.
28 Edele, Soviet Veterans, 16-17 and chapter 7. Also compare the entries for “veteran” in Sovietskaia voennaia ent-
siklopediia, vol. 2, ed. A. A. Grechko, Moscow 1976, p. 121; with the same item in Voennaia entsiklopediia, vol. 2, 
ed. P. S. Grachev, Moscow 1994, 80. 
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“the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, the intelligentsia, women and men, veterans 
and youth, … nations and nationalities.”29 Hence, veterans had fi nally found their socio-
logical place – as an organized, legally privileged generation.30
Not all terms for war veterans were unambiguously positive. Like in Czechoslovakia or 
Yugoslavia (see the contributions by Natali Stegmann and Heike Karge in this volume), 
the status of war invalid and war participant were defi ned explicitly as referring to those 
who had fought on the Soviet side. Th ose who had served in anti-Soviet formations were 
thus excluded.31 A liminal position between these two groups was occupied by former 
POWs (byvshie voennoplennye) who had been repatriated to the Soviet Union after the 
war’s end (repatriirovannye grazhdane).32 Notwithstanding popular views to the opposite, 
they were not all sent to the Gulag or shot, but rather screened in a complex and nearly 
discriminate process (given what one might expect from Stalin’s regime according to the 
precedents of the 1930s and the legal defi nition of captivity as treason).33 Once cleared 
of wrongdoing, the welfare provisions for these 1.8 million returnees were similar to 
those of demobilized soldiers, although they were subject to some residency restrictions. 
Th ey were also vulnerable to re-arrest throughout the years of Stalin’s rule and their legal 
position remained problematic even after their somewhat silent rehabilitation in the 
1950s.34 
Table 3 summarizes the legal categories and the approximate group sizes in the immedi-
ate postwar years, when legal privileges were ubiquitous for veterans. It is noteworthy, 
that this reconstruction shows only 62 percent of veterans covered by welfare legislation, 
if we disregard the minor advantages for war participants at the time. Th is is obviously 
not an exact number, as the tally of demobilized soldiers is still not more than an edu-
cated guess, and the total number of veterans is a reconstruction. Th e share of the privi-
leged would also rise if we use “war participants” (row E) as the base-line, but even then 
we would speak only of 78 percent.
29 M. S. Gorbachev, speech at the CC Plenum, 27 January 1987, in: Pravda, 28 January 1987, pp. 1-5, here: 2, 3.
30 Stephen Lovell, Soviet Russia’s Older Generations, in: Generations in Twentieth-Century Europe, ed. Stephen 
Lovell, Houndsmills/Basingstokes 2007, 205-26.
31 There is some limited discussion of this issue in the veterans’ press in the late Soviet years. See, for example, S. 
Kazimir, Bylo, da ne splylo, in: Veteran, No. 9, 1988, 11; and reactions by readers: Chitateli prodolzhaiut razgovor. 
Proshchenie net i ne budet!, in: Veteran, No. 15, 1988, 6. On those who served in anti-Soviet units see A. V. Oko-
rokov, Antisovetsie voinskie formirovaniia v gody Vtoroi Mirovoi voiny, Moscow 2000. 
32 See, for example, Pavel Polian, Deportiert nach Hause. Sowjetische Kriegsgefangene im „Dritten Reich“ und Ihre 
Repatriierung, Munich/Vienna 2001, or Ulrike Goeken-Haidl, Der Weg zurück. Die Repatriierung sowjetischer 
Zwangsarbeiter und Kriegsgefangener während und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Essen 2006. 
33 Katrin Boeckh, Stalinismus in der Ukraine. Die Rekonstruktion des sowjetischen Systems nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg, Wiesbaden 2007, 303, 318, 541.
34 Edele, Soviet Veterans of the Second World War, chapter 5. For the number repatriated: 102. On the silent re-
habilitation see also Beate Fieseler, Innenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit 1945–1953, in: In Handbuch der Geschichte 
Russlands. Vol. 5: 1945–1991. Vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs bis zum Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion. 1. 
Halbband, ed. Stefan Plaggenborg, Stuttgart 2002, 36-77, here: 48.
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(in %) Date Notes
A
Veterans (in the Latin 
meaning of the word) 25 100 1945
Not a legal 
category
B




3.8 15 1941–1945 Covered by legislation begin-
ning in 1940
C  ’ ’ ’ 2.8 11 1946
D  ’ ’ ’ 2.6 10 ?








Only a minor 
legal status 
until 1978












in parallel with 
discrimination
I maximum number covered 15.5 62 I = B+G+H
However we turn to the available data, then, they do not imply complete coverage of vet-
erans during the immediate postwar years. One group self-evidently not privileged were 
those who found themselves in Stalin’s Gulag after their return. Others were less unlucky, 
but still outside of the system of special provisions. Soldiers who had been demobilized 
during the war, those who stayed in the army, and those who had been “invalided out” 
but were subsequently categorized as healthy, fell through the net of legislation. Many 
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within this excluded group, however, might have been among those holding high-level 
decorations, which gave the right to an additional set of privileges until those were abol-
ished in late 1947.35
Overall, then, the legal history of veterans can be summarized thusly: During and im-
mediately after the war, a large share of veterans were covered under the overlapping leg-
islations for demobilized soldiers, war invalids, repatriated citizens and war participants 
more generally (see table 3). Recipients of higher decorations were covered under an 
additional set of advantages, which were dismantled at the end of 1947. Th is year marks 
the transition to the second period in this history, where special provisions were largely 
absent, leaving only war invalids as a legally recognized group. Th e category of recipients 
was consistently kept as small as possible through restrictive defi nitions and humiliat-
ing examinations. During this period, veterans did not cease to feel entitled to special 
treatment and many other citizens basically agreed. However, the state only started to 
recognize these entitlements through a legal status during the third phase, which began 
in 1978. In this year, “war participants” became a status group with special provisions, 
which were subsequently broadened to more and more of those who had survived World 
War II. 1986 can stand as an end-point in this transformation of veterans into a legally 
defi ned and organized war generation. 
Th e history of Soviet veterans as a corporate group thus has a clear historical rhythm. An 
original status group was forged during the period when the wartime emergency and the 
postwar problems engendered welfare legislation for various subgroups, which converged 
to a considerable degree between 1945 and 1947. It survived as an entitlement commu-
nity after most of the privileges (except provisions for war invalids) were dismantled in 
1947 and 1948, to re-emerge in 1978 as a new status group of “war participants,” whose 
privileges were subsequently broadened to more and more “veterans” of the “war genera-
tion” in the 1980s. 
2. The Soviet welfare state and the veterans
How does this periodization relate to the history of the Soviet welfare state? From the 
very beginning, the Soviets competed with the “capitalist” countries in caring for the 
population. At times, this welfare state building was suspended and often even rolled 
back in order to deal with perceived emergencies and actual wars, but overall, the claim 
always was that this was a fairer, better, and more equal society than any other. While 
in practice often better understood as a warfare state, the Soviet leadership had other 
aspirations, too. In order to outperform the developing welfare states outside its borders, 
the Bolsheviks instituted, in October 1918, social insurance for all toilers. Th is universal 
system was fated to exist mainly on paper, and was dismantled in the 1920s and 1930s, 
to be replaced by highly stratifi ed provisions. In this Stalinist version, welfare became 
35 Edele, Soviet Veterans, 191-192.
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a means of mobilization to labor and war, and, hence, extremely unequal. Sick leave, 
for example, diff ered according to profession, length of service, branch of industry, and 
personal work discipline. Pensions, where available, followed the same logic of hierarchy 
and meritocracy. Th e war further dismantled parts of the welfare structure (the social 
security system and child protection services, for example), while adding the new provi-
sions for soldiers and war invalids referred to above. Vigorous attempts to build a more 
universalized health-care system in particular from the late 1930s onwards, continued to 
be thwarted by the demands of mobilization for war, followed by the costs of the atomic 
weapons program.36 
While thus already the 1936 Constitution had promised “the right to material security in 
old age, as well as in case of illness or loss of the ability to work”, it took into the 1950s 
that such claims were slowly realized, not least because the example of “Western” wel-
fare democracies forced the authorities’ hands somewhat. A landmark was the pension 
reform of 1956, which universalized and systematized the chaotic legislation which had 
developed since the 1920s. In 1965, even collective farmers – always the step-children of 
Soviet politics – were brought into the pension system. By now, the Soviet welfare state 
had become a central part of the regime’s claims to legitimate rule. No wonder, then, that 
the old article, which had promised material security in the 1936 constitution (art. 120) 
became longer (now art. 43) in the new constitution of 1977.37
We can thus see two phases in the interconnection of the veterans’ benefi ts system and 
the Soviet welfare state after World War II. First, the two developed independently from 
each other. Indeed, the state was extremely reluctant to institute veterans’ benefi ts, which 
after 1948 were restricted to war invalids’ care, which constituted a better system than 
what non-military disabled had to contend with.38 Until 1978, however, this parallel 
universe did not play a leading role in welfare state formation. Unlike in the United 
States, where provisions for returning soldiers of the Civil War were slowly broadened to 
36 Pavel Stiller, Die sowjetische Rentenversicherung 1917–1977, Cologne 1979, 10-12, 15-16, 66; id., Sozialpoli-
tik in der UdSSR 1950–1980. Eine Analyse der quantitativen und qualitativen Zusammenhänge, Baden-Baden 
1983; Bernice Q. Madison, Social Welfare in the Soviet Union, Stanford, Calif. 1968, 45, 51-53; Susan Zimmer-
mann, Wohlfahrtspolitik und die staatssozialistische Entwicklungsstrategie in der ‘anderen’ Hälfte Europas im 
20. Jahrhundert, in: Sozialpolitik in der Peripherie. Entwicklungsmuster und Wandel in Lateinamerika, Afrika, 
Asien und Osteuropa, ed. Johannes Jäger, Gerhad Melinz and Susan Zimmermann, Frankfurt a. M. 2001, 211-37; 
Christopher Burton, Medical Welfare During Late Stalinism. A Study of Doctors and the Soviet Health System, 
1945–1953, Ph.D. diss., The University of Chicago, 2000 (see esp. his overview of the health system in chapter 
1); A. A. Danilov / A. V. Pyzhikov, Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy. SSSR v pervye poslevoennye gody, Moscow 2001, 
101-102, 114; Dorena Caroli, Bolshevism, Stalinism, and Social Welfare (1917–1936), in: International Review of 
Social History 48 (2003): 27-54.
37 F. J. M. Feldbrugge (ed.), The Constitutions of the USSR and the Union Republics: Analysis, Texts, Reports, Ger-
mantown, Maryland 1979, 96-97; Stiller, Die sowjetische Rentenversicherung, 10-12, 15. For a study of the histo-
rical development of the Soviet pension system and its transformation after the breakdown of the Soviet Union 
see Andrea Chandler, Shocking Mother Russia. Democratization, Social Rights, and Pension Reform in Russia, 
1990–2001, Toronto 2004.
38 Bernice Madison, Programs for the Disabled in the USSR, in: The Disabled in the Soviet Union. Past and Present, 
Theory and Practice, ed. William O. McCagg and Lewis Siegelbaum, Pittsburg 1989, 167-98, here: 185-8; Fieseler, 
Die Invaliden des ‘Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges’, 164, 472-75.
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more and more citizens, and unlike Australia, where the care for the obviously deserving 
poor of the World War broke open barriers for welfare provisions more generally, in the 
Soviet Union the growing welfare sector developed partially from ideological sources and 
partially as a result of the “peaceful competition” with the capitalist world.39 It was only 
from 1978, when war participants were integrated into a newly created status group, that 
the causal nexus developed which made war veterans into the avant garde of the Soviet 
welfare state, their privileges becoming the blueprint for provisions for the entire older 
generation. 
3. Social mobility
Th e central distinction between entitlement claims and actually instituted privileges, 
which underwrites the analysis presented here, is obscured in much of the literature.40 
Some authors suggest that the absence of formal rights mattered little, as “informal privi-
leges” were ubiquitous in Soviet society, leading to “upward mobility for many soldiers.”41 
Th is thesis is half correct, but also empirically imprecise. “Informal privileges” did exist 
and in individual cases helped veterans to get ahead in life, but they could not compen-
sate for the lacking legal privileges and their administrative implementation; they could 
not, and did not, lead to social mobility of veterans as a group. Th e Soviet Union was not 
France, at least not before 1978.
Legal and institutional histories thus matters. It is true that the sense of entitlement 
veterans felt after the war was accepted as legitimate by many Soviet citizens, includ-
ing many local and regional offi  cials with decision making powers over access to scarce 
resources, in particular housing.42 Returned Slavic servicemen could also take advan-
tage of resources (houses, agricultural land, etc.) that the wartime ethnic cleansing had 
freed up in the Caucasus. In what used to be Eastern Prussia as well as in the Karelian 
Isthmus, special settlement schemes intended to “improve” the ethnic composition of 
these borderlands, favored demobilized soldiers and their families.43 In the Baltics, the 
understaff ed Communist Party was in parts fi lled with demobilized soldiers, many of 
them Russians, who often were promoted into leading positions as well.44 In the other 
“Western borderlands” (Ukraine, Belorussia) the postwar cleansing of the elite of those 
39 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers. The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States, Cam-
bridge, Mass. 1992. On Australia see, inter alia, Stephen Garton, The Cost of War. Australians Return, Melbourne 
1996, William De Maria, Combat and Concern: The Warfare-Welfare Nexus, in: War & Society 7, no. 1 (1990): 71-86. 
40 For example: Amir Weiner, The Making of a Dominant Myth: The Second World War and the Construction of 
Political Identities within the Soviet Polity, in: The Russian Review 55 (1996); and id., Making Sense of War. The 
Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution, Princeton / Oxford 2000.
41 Danilova, The Development of an Exclusive Veterans’ Policy, 12-13.
42 This point becomes particularly clear if veterans are compared to re-evacuees. See Rebecca Manley, To the 
Tashkent Station. Evacuation and Survival in the Soviet Union at War, Ithaca/London 2009, 260-62.
43 See Edele, Veterans and the Village, 169-70.
44 Elena Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml’. 1940–1953, Moscow 2008, 149-50, 155. 
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who might have “collaborated” with the enemy also advantaged veterans, who could 
draw on their war-service as proof for their loyalty.45 Within the unoccupied heartland, 
too, we can list many examples of invented rights which were realized at the local level, 
as well as instances of informal affi  rmative action for returned combat personnel.46 As a 
result of all of these processes, veterans did move up in the world.
Th is upwardly mobile group, however, did not constitute a majority. Th e peasant soldiers 
entering the Communist Party at the frontline and moving on to higher education and a 
career in politics and administration were a small minority, both among war participants 
as a whole and among peasant-soldiers in particular. Only one percent of demobilized 
soldiers were students by early 1947 and a large share of these would have entered higher 
education with or without the war. Ninety-nine percent did other things. Th e Party-men 
dominating postwar politics on all levels were veterans, it is true, but they, too were a 
minority, as the majority of war survivors – at least 79 percent – were not Party members. 
Pre-war trends in party admissions were continued at the front, which meant that the 
educated remained more likely than the uneducated to become comrades; workers and 
employees continued to join far above their share in the population; while the obverse 
tendency continued for peasants. Offi  cers joined more than the ranks and more special-
ized units had more party members.47 Much of the visibility of veterans in administra-
tion and politics, then, was an eff ect of men (and some women), who had served in the 
army, returning to their prewar life trajectories. In terms of political generation, Stalin’s 
promotees of the 1930s (whether they later became frontoviki or not) dominated the 
Soviet polity until the 1980s, not the wartime generation.48 
As far as the majority of returnees are concerned, they did eventually leave the village, 
but whether or not the move from collective farmer to unskilled factory hand constitutes 
“upward mobility” remains a matter of judgment. Moreover, a close examination of the 
now available data indicates that veterans (like everybody else) were fl eeing the exploi-
tation in agriculture rather than seeking the bright light of the city. Originally, most 
returned to “mud and cockroaches” (Catherine Merridale), only to leave once postwar 
dreams of a better village turned out to be hollow. No informal esteem for the defend-
ers of the motherland could compensate for the economic exploitation of the mass of 
Soviet veterans after the war – the returned peasant-soldiers who had made up the ranks 
of Stalin’s army.49 As far as the sometimes celebrated “Stalinist care” (Stalinskaia zabota) 
for disabled veterans is concerned, it might be suffi  cient to point out that 70 percent of 
45 On Ukraine see Weiner, Making Sense of War, chapter 1. 
46 Edele, Soviet Veterans, 133, 195-96.
47 Ibid., 134-38, 142, and chapter 6 (on social mobility).
48 John D. Nagle, A New Look at the Soviet Elite: A Generational Model of the Soviet System, in: Journal of Political 
& Military Sociology 3, no. 1 (1975). See also, with much more detail: Evan Mawdsley / Stephen White, The Soviet 
Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev. The Central Committee and its Members, 1917–1991, Oxford 2003.
49 Mark Edele, Veterans and the Village: The Impact of Red Army Demobilization on Soviet Urbanization, 1945–
1955, in: Russian History 36, no. 2 (2009): 159-82; and Merridale, Ivan’s War, 362. 
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those rounded up as beggars during a campaign against “anti-social, parasitic elements” 
in 1951–53 were war or labor invalids.50
Eventually, however, veterans did become a central status group in Soviet society, leading 
the way for welfare provisions and an elevated symbolic status for the entire “older gen-
eration.” Why this shift in 1978? Partially, this is a story of a contingent political event, 
of unintended consequences of the constitutional debate of 1977, of backroom politics, 
the lobbying of the veterans’ organization, and the letter-writing activities of rank-and-
fi le veterans all over the Soviet Union.51 But there were longer-term transformations at 
play, too, which made 1978 and what followed possible in the fi rst place. Th e original 
reluctance of the political leadership to reward returning soldiers with special privileges 
was partially of ideological origin: veterans were just citizens who had served in the 
army, they were not a social group in a Marxist understanding, and hence they did not 
exist “in themselves.” But the state’s resistance to the veterans’ entitlement claims was 
also motivated by hard-headed realism. In 1945, about 15 percent of the population 
were veterans, not counting irregulars of all kinds; a slightly smaller group, about twelve 
percent, were acknowledged as “war participants,” and about two percent of all Soviets 
were recognized as war invalids. Th ese were signifi cant shares, once spouses, children and 
dependents were added to these potential benefi ciaries of a veterans’ benefi ts system. Th e 
leader of the country expected war with the United States in the not-so-distant future 
while having to contend with a destroyed economy they had to re-build without foreign 
aid. Privileges for returning soldiers would cost too much and lessen the incentives to 
go back to work and re-build Socialism in order to fi ght another day. By the late 1970s, 
money was still an issue for the decision makers, but the group of potential benefi ciaries 
was much smaller. According to the data of the SKVV, there were eight million war par-
ticipants in the country in 1979, at a time when the total population of the Soviet Union 
stood at 241 million.52 Th e share of all veterans, hence, was not much larger than the 
share of war invalids had been after the war. And while the country was still crippled by 
systemic shortages as well as the long-term consequences of the war, the crisis years were 
over and even something of a consumer society had taken shape.53 
50 Report by Minister of Interior S. Kruglov and Militia boss N. Stakhanov on struggle to liquidate begging (20 Feb-
ruary 1954), available at http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/almanah/inside/almanah-doc/1007415 (accessed 
July 2010). On this campaign see also Sheila Fitzpatrick, Social Parasites. How Tramps, Idle Youth, and Busy Entre-
preneurs Impeded the Soviet March to Communism, in: Cahier du Monde russe 47, no. 1-2 (2006): 377-408. For 
a wider perspective on the history of begging see Hubertus F. Jahn, Armes Russland. Bettler und Notleidende in 
der russischen Geschichte vom Mittelalter bis in die Gegenwart, Paderborn 2010.
51 Mark Edele, Collective Action in Soviet Society: The Case of War Veterans, in: Writing the Stalin Era: Sheila Fitzpa-
trick and Soviet Historiography, ed. Kiril Tomoff , Julie Hessler, and Golfo Alexopoulos, Palgrave 2011.
52 Shorthand report of 4th SKVV plenum, 19 September 1979, GARF f. r-9541, op. 1, d. 1520, l. 118 (the number 
refers to uchastniki grazhdanskoi i Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, a number including the remaining survivors of 
the Civil War); and Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1979 goda, vol. II: Pol, vozrast i sostoianie v brake nasele-
niia SSSR, soiuznykh i avtonomnykh respublik, kraev i oblastei. Chast’ I. Statisticheskii sbornik, Moscow 1989, 32.
53 On normalization see Julie Hessler, Postwar Normalisation and Its Limits in the USSR: The Case of Trade, in: Eu-
rope-Asia Studies 53, no. 3 (2001): 445-71; Donald Filtzer, The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers in 
the Immediate Postwar Period, 1945–1948, in: Europe-Asia Studies 51, no. 6 (1999): 1013-38; on the war’s long-
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Clearly, it was much easier to accommodate three percent of the population during 
times of relative (if modest) prosperity than twelve or even 15 percent during a period 
of catastrophic wartime destruction. Simply put, the Soviet Union was not the United 
States of America, which could aff ord to extend veterans’ benefi ts to about half of the 
population by the 1960s, while also investing heavily in armaments.54 Th ere had also 
been a cultural shift, which had replaced the Revolution with the Great Patriotic War 
as the major legitimizing myth. Brezhnev himself constantly claimed his own heroic 
past as central to who he was, and the bombastic war cult the leader helped instigate in 
the 1960s and 1970s had its own doing in transforming war veterans into part of the 
symbolic center of this society. Th e subsequent broadening of the group of the privileged 
to all who had participated in the wider war eff ort, while neither planned nor foreseen 
by policy makers in 1978, was also only logical in this context. Th e war had taken on a 
symbolic life of its own, a life which continues to this day despite the slimming of the 
ranks of the survivors.
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